

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2043

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 5741

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SNAR, PK
SUBJECT: DRUG CONTROL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

REF: STATE 101326

THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS THE RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED
IN THE REFTEL WITH PARAGRAPH LETTERING AND NUMBERING
CORRESPONDING TO THOSE IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE REFERENCE.
BECAUSE OF THE SLOWNESS OF THE POUCH, IT IS SUBMITTED
TELEGRAPHICALLY.

A. PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING:

(1) THE EMBASSY'S GUESSTIMATE OF 200-250 TONS OF OPIUM
PRODUCTION IN PAKISTAN IS SO UNCERTAIN THAT WE HESITATE
TO PUT IT FORWARD. THERE IS LIMITED FACTUAL BASIS FOR
ANY ESTIMATE. USAID CONTRACTS ANNUALLY FOR A POPPY
ACREAGE SURVEY WHICH, COMBINED WITH AN ESTIMATED AVERAGE
YIELD FROM THE SAME SOURCE, PUTS PRODUCTION AT ABOUT
200 TONS. THE PNCB GUESSES PRODUCTION IN THE 150-200
TON RANGE. THE UN NARCOTICS COORDINATOR WILL NOT
VENTURE A GUESS BUT SAYS HE HAS NO REASON TO DOUBT
THAT OURS IS CLOSE. ALL POPPY IS GROWN IN THE
NORTHWEST FRONTIER PROVINCE (NWFP) WITH ABOUT ONE-
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THIRD IN FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED BUT INTERNALLY SELF-
GOVERNING TRIBAL AREAS, ONE-THIRD IN FULLY SETTLED
AREAS AND ONE-THIRD IN AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN
CONVERTED INTO SETTLED AREAS WITHIN THE PAST FOUR YEARS
BUT IN WHICH FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL LAWS APPLY IN
VARYING DEGREES. VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE OPIUM GUM MOVES
QUICKLY INTO THE TRIBAL AREAS WHERE IT IS THEN

EFFECTIVELY OUT OF REACH OF THE LAW. AS AFGHANISTAN HAS CORRESPONDING DE FACTO TRIBAL AREAS ALONG ITS BORDER, THE PRODUCT OF THE TWO COUNTRIES BECOMES INTERMINGLED. MOST OF THE MORPHINE COVERSION LABORATORIES FOUND TO DATE HAVE BEEN IN OR NEAR THE TRIBAL AREAS. LABS HAVE ALSO BEEN FOUND IN LAHORE AND LYALLPUR IN THE PUNJAB. FROM THE TRIBAL AREAS PART OF THE OPIUM MOVES OUT TO THE PAKISTAN DOMESTIC MARKET. THE PNCB BELIEVES THAT 70 PERCENT OF DEOMESTIC PRODUCTION IS CONSUMED IN PAKISTAN BUT WE BELIEVE THIS MAY BE SOMEWHAT HIGH. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ROADS AND TRAILS OVER WHICH THIS TRAFFIC CAN MOVE TO LAHORE, MOST OF IT COMES DIRECTLY DOWN THE GRAND TRUNK HIGHWAY FROM PESHAWAR THROUGH RAWALPINDI TO LAHORE. THE MAJORITY OF ALL GOODS IN PAKISTAN NOW MOVE BY HIGHWAY TRANSPORT WITH THE GRAND TRUNK THE ONLY MAJOR SUPPLY ROUTE FOR NORTHERN PWFISTAN AND A MAJOR SUPPLY ROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN. THUS THE COVER AND OPPORTUNITY FOR THIS TRAFFIC IS EXCELLENT. THE BULK OF THE INTERNATIONAL ILLICIT TRAFFIC IS BELIEVED TO MOVE OUT OF THE TRIBAL AREAS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN TO IRAN. SOME OPIUM TRAFFIC MOVES ON FROM LAHORE TO EXIT FROM KARACHI AND THERE ARE MINOR ROUTES FROM PESHAWAR TO BALUCHISTAN WHERE SOME GO WEST INTO IRAN AND OTHERS GO TO THE BALUCHISTAN COAST FOR TRANSSHIPMENT BY SMALL NATIVE BOATS TO THE UAE.

TRAFFIC ROUTES FOR HASHISH AND HASHISH OIL HAVE BEEN
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ESTABLISHED TO BOTH NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE. MULTI-TON CONSIGNMENTS OF HASHISH USUALLY ARE SHIPPED BY SEA FROM KARACHI TO LONDON, AMSTERDAM, AND IN SEVERAL CASES NORTH AMERICA. CONSIGNMENTS INVOLVING LESS THAN A TON ARE USUALLY SHIPPED BY AIR AS PAKISTAN TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS DIRECTLY TO ITS DESTINATION. SOME TRAFFICKERS FROM THE US HAVE PURCHASED VEHICLES IN EUROPE AND HAVE CONTRACTED WITH PAKISTANIS TO DELIVER CONSIGNMENTS TO EUROPE WHERE THE HASHISH IS LOADED IN TRAPPED COMPARTMENTS IN THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE IS THEN USUALLY SHIPPED TO THE US. SMALLER QUANTITIES ARE SMUGGLED IN ACCOMPANIED LUGGAGE AND BODY PACKS. HASH OIL, A RELATIVELY NEW PRODUCT, IS USUALLY SHIPPED AS BODY PACKS OR ACCOMPANIED LUGGAGE BY AIR TRAVELLERS. MORPHINE SULFATE IS USUALLY SMUGGLED IN ACCOMPANIED LUGGAGE. ORIGINALLY ISTANBUL WAS USED AS A TRANS-SHIPMENT AREA BUT NOW THE MORPHINE SULFATE IS SMUGGLED DIRECTLY TO AMSTERDAM, ZURICH, COPENHAGEN,

AND GERMANY. THERE ARE NO KNOWN ROUTES TO THE US
FOR MORPHINE SULFATE.

(2) THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IN THE RECENT PAST IT
WAS CONCEIVABLE THAT LABS COULD EXIST IN THE NWFP
WITHOUT SANCTION FROM HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITIES. PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURE CONTROLS
HAVE BEEN SO LAX THAT LOCAL AUTHORITIES COULD HAVE
BELIEVED THEY WERE SANCTIONING LICENSED OR UNLICENSED
MANUFACTURE OF SIMPLE PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS.
RECENTLY LOCATED LABS ARE MAINLY IN THE TRIBAL AREAS
WHERE CENTRAL CONTROL IS NIL AND LOCAL COUNCILS ARE
AS YET UNCONCERNED WITH MORE SOPHISTICATED GOVERN-
MENT FUNCTIONS SUCH AS SANCTIONING OF MANUFACTURING.

IN TERMS OF GOVERNMENT SANCTION IN GENERAL FOR
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND PRODUCERS, THE GOP REALIZES
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THAT TO EXERT SUFFICIENT CONTROL OVER THE TRIBAL
AREAS TO ELIMINATE UNACCEPTABLE PRICE FROM ANY
GOVERNMENT. THIS FACT, COMBINED WITH THE NEED TO
MAINTAIN POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE NWFP WHICH IS A
STRONG BASE OF OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY IN POWER, ARE
THE FUNDAMENTAL REASONS FOR FEDERAL INACTION AGAINST

INDIGENOUS TRAFFICKERS AND PRODUCERS. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF REASONS THAT NWFP OFFICIALS IGNORE NARCOTICS PROBLEMS INCLUDING: VOTING POWER OF THE GROWERS IN MANY DISTRICTS AND SOME POLITICIANS' POSITIONS AS)-,94\$ 9* &49234 ; THE HISTORIC CONCEPT OF OPIUM AS A REVENUE MATTER BY PROVINCIAL EXCISE DEPARTMENTS; LIMITED ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES IN MANY AREAS; THE HONORABLE POSITION SOCIETY GIVES SMUGGLERS IN GENERAL IN THIS AREA; AND THE EXTRAORDINARILY CLOSE FAMILIAL AND TRIBAL TIES IN THIS REGION.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, SERIOUS CORRUPTION, SMUGGLING, ETC., IS QUITE COMMONPLACE IN THE GOP WITH HIGH LEVEL INVOLVEMENT AND/OR SANCTION AND PERIODIC CASES OF SUCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE NARCOTICS AREA WOULD NOT BE SURPRISING. WE HAVE NO SOLID PRESENT EVIDENCE OF SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT AN ONGOING DEA INVESTIGATION IS UNCOVERING STRONG INDICATIONS OF REASONABLY HIGH LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT AND EVEN HIGHER LEVEL AWARENESS
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OF THIS INVOLVEMENT IN HASHISH TRAFFICKING. IF PRESENT INFORMATION PROVES CORRECT, THE EMBASSY IS CONVINCED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE AT LEAST ANTICIPATING THAT TOP LEVELS OF THE GOP WOULD ATTEMPT TO COVER-UP ANY DISCOVERY OF THEIR OPERATIONS. THE MAIN DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING NEW NARCOTICS LEGISLATION HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO STANDARD BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES IN PAKISTAN COMBIINED WITH PERCEIVED NEED TO CLEAR EACH DRAFT STAGE WITH UN OFFICIALS IN GENEVA. EARLY PROVINCIAL OBSTABCLES WERE BASED MORE UPON FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL DIVISION OF POWERS THAN PROTECTION OF TRAFFICKERS. THE FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE PRIME MINISTER, WHO HAS PUSHED THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL MENDMENTS IN DAYS, WAS FULLY COMMITTED TO THIS LEGISLATION IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN OPERATION LONG AGO. THE LENIENT SENTENCES WERE MORE LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN THE RESULT OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES AND PRESSURES.

(3) ALL SEIZED OPIUM AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM COURT EVIDENTIARY CUSTODY IS TURNED OVER TO THE ALKALOID FACTORY IN LAHORE. THAT AMOUNT NOT NEEDED OR UTILIZED IMMEDIATELY IN THE LEGAL VEND DISTRIBUTION IN PAKISTAN IS STOCKPILED. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE FROM THE LAHORE FACTORY. OPIUM IS SO CHEAPLY AND READILY AVAILABLE THAT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ANYONE WOULD ATTEMPT ANY LARGE SCALE DIVERSION WITH THE RISK THAT SOME POLICE ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN.

(4) THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON

THE END MARKET FOR PAKISTANI OPIUM IS STILL TRUE BUT THERE ARE NO MEANS TO DETERMINE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS. OUR CALCULATED GUESS IS THAT 55-65 PERCENT IS CONSUMED INCOUNTRY, ABOUT 35-40 PERCENT GOES TO IRAN, AND POSSIBLY 5 PERCENT GOES BEYOND THIS REGION IN ANY FORM. THERE IS KNOWN TO BE A SMALL, UNQUANTIFIED
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MOVEMENT OF OPIATES TO THE UAE.

(5) THE EMBASSY WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE ABLE TO ENFORCE A CREDIBLE BAN THROUGHOUT THE SETTLED AND MERGED AREAS WITHIN FIVE

YEARS. WITH A PHASED PROGRAM OF INCOME SUBSTITUTION ACCOMPANIED BY ENFORCEMENT, THE GOP COULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE PRODUCTION IN THESE AREAS DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. WITH CONSTANT MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL PRESSURE AND REASONABLE FORWARD MOVEMENT BY PAKISTANI STANDARDS, WE COULD REALISTICALLY EXPECT THE ELIMINATION OF POPPY GROWTH FROM IRRIGATED AREAS AND THE MAIN VALLEYS IN THE SETTLED AND MERGED DISTRICTS WITHIN FIVE YEARS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOP WOULD CONTROL GROWTH IN ALL THE SCATTERED, MOUNTAINOUS AND LESS FERTILE POCKETS IN THESE DISTRICTS WHERE STRONG TRIBAL-TYPE LOCAL GOVERNMENT STILL EXISTS. THIS MIGHT REDUCE THE GROWING AREA BY 50-60 PERCENT BUT WE COULD EXPECT SOME INCREASED GROWTH IN THE POCKETS MENTIONED ABOVE AND IN THE FORMAL TRIBAL AREAS.

(6) CURRENT PRICES:

	WHOLESALE	RETAIL
OPIUM	\$55/KG	\$85-100/KG
MORPHINE BASE	\$6500/KG	\$6500/KG
NO. 3 HEROIN	NONE AVAILABLE	
NO. 4 HEROIN	\$10,000/KG	UNKNOWN
MORPHINE SULPHATE	\$400 PER 1000	\$.75-\$1./UNIT
TABLETS		

MORPHINE SULPHATE MR \$6500/KG
POWDER

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THE FBBASSU HAS NO DATA ON PRICE TRENDS.

(7) HASHISH IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN USED BY A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF THE LOWER ECONOMIC STRATA IN PAKISTAN, SUCH AS LABORERS AND TRUCK DRIVERS. A RECENT INFORMAL PNCB SURVEY INDICATED THAT 90 PERCENT OF THE TRUCK DRIVERS OPERATE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF HASHISH OR

BARBITURATES. THERE IS NO LOCAL DEMAND FOR HASHISH OIL AND NO KNOWN USE OF COCAINE BY PAKISTANIS. SOME

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 5741

OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED ALARM AT WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE INCREASING USE OF DEPRESSANTS BY YOUTH, PARTICULARLY STUDENTS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO STUDIES, HOWEVER, TO ESTABLISH THIS USAGE AND ITS EXTENT. HASHISH GROWN WILD THROUGHOUT NORTHERN PAKISTAN AND IS READILY AVAILABLE FROM MULTIPLE RETAIL SHOPS EVEN THOUGH TECHNICALLY ILLEGAL. PAKISTAN'S PHARMA-CEUTICAL CONTROLS ARE EXTREMELY LAX AND MANY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CAN BE PURCHASED AT ALMOST ANY LICENSED PHARMACY WITHOUT PRESCRIPTION. A NEW PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROL LAW HAS ALREADY RESULTED IN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN MANUFACTURING CONTROL AND COULD DO THE SAME IN THE WHOLESALE AND RETAIL SECTORS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOP HAS SUFFICIENT MANPOWER TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH IN THESE SECTORS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. FURTHER DATA ON VOLUMES, SOURCES AND PATTERNS ARE NOT AVAILABLE.

B. FINANCIAL FACTORS:

(1) THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY UNUSUAL FINANCIAL FLOWS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE SENSE POSED BY REFTEL. THERE IS A CONTINUOUS FLOW OF FINANCE AND GOODS ACROSS THE PAK-AFGHAN BORDER IN A SMUGGLING TRADE WHICH INCLUDES CONFIDENTIAL

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OPIUM. HOWEVER, THIS TRADE HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR GENERATIONS AND WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF RECENT INCREASES.

(2) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN BANK INVOLVEMENT WHATSOEVER.

(3) IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT NARCOTICS TRAFFIC HAS LED TO ANY SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT IN WHOLLY LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. IT IS KNOWN THAT THE FEW FAMILIES WHO CONTROL MUCH OF THE LICENSED OPIUM VENDS IN PAKISTAN ALSO CONTROL A LARGE PART OF THE ILLICITY DOMESTIC OPIUM SALES AND TRAFFICKING. THIS IS AS CLOSE AS ONE COMES TO CROSS FINANCING LICIT BUSINESS AND OPIUM TRAFFIC. WE BELIEVE THAT OTHER PROFITS IN ILLICIT OPIUM REMAIN IN THE SMUGGLING TRADE.

(3) THERE HAVE BEEN NO INSTANCES OF ENTIRE BUSINESSES BEING USED AS COVER FOR TRAFFICKING IN OPIATES. THE FEW INSTANCES OF ORCIAL COVER HAVE INVOLVED INDIVIDUALS AND HAVE NOT FIT ANY PARTICULAR PATTERN. THE ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION IS PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS. THERE ARE SEVERAL KNOWN INSTANCES OF PIA EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND MUCH WIDER INVOLVEMENT IS SUSPECTED. WHEN ADVISED OF THE SITUATION, PIA EXECUTIVES HAVE NOT MOVED AS FORCEFULLY AS THEY SHOULD, CLAIMING POTENTIAL EMBARRASSMENT AND DISRUPTION. HIGHER-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT OR PROFITTING WITHIN PIA IS POSSIBLE.

C. CONSUMPTION AND TREATMENT:

(1) THE PNCB ESTIMATES THE OPIUM USER POPULATION IN PAKISTAN AT 60,000 AND HAS BEEN REVISING ITS ESTIMATES UPWARD DUE TO MORE AND BETTER INFORMATION RATHER THAN CONFIDENTIAL

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ANY POPULATION GROWTH. THERE ARE NO RELIABLE FIGURES

OR STUDIES OF AGE, SEX, OR OTHER POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS. UNFDAC IS FINANCING A SERIES OF STUDIES WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE SOME OF THIS DATA WITHIN THE NEXT TWO YEARS. OPIUM IS SMOKED, INHALED, OR EATEN IN PAKISTAN WITH ALMOST NO INJECTION.

(A) THERE IS NO OFFICIAL TREATMENT PROGRAM. INDIVIDUALS CAN SECURE TREATMENT AT ONLY A FEW GENERAL HOSPITALS IN LARGER TOWNS AND CITIES. THERE ARE NO FIGURES AVAILABLE ON PERSONS IN TREATMENT PROGRAMS.

(B) NO PRIVATE CENTERS IN EXISTENCE.

(C) USERS ARE IGNORED AND THEREFORE THIS QUESTION DOES NOT APPLY.

(D) SAME AS 1 ABOVE.

(2) THERE ARE NO KNOWN HEROIN ADDICTS IN PAKISTAN.

(3) OTHER DRUGS OF CONCERN ARE HASHISH AND THE PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO VALID STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF DRUG USAGE IN PAKISTAN. ONE EFFECT THAT IS READILY NOTICEABLE RELATES TO PROFESSIONAL DRIVERS. ROAD TRANSPORT AND BUS DRIVERS MUST PUT IN EXTRAORDINARILY LONG HOURS OVER CROWDED AND POORLY MAINTAINED ROADS. A VERY LARGE MAJORITY OF THESE DRIVERS UTILIZE DRUGS RESULTING IN A VERY HIGH ACCIDENT RATE. THERE IS ALSO SOME OFFICIAL BUT UNESTABLISHED CONCERN THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE INCREASINGLY USING PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS. THE PNCB MAINTAINS AS HIGH A PRIORITY AGAINST HASHISH AND HASHISH OIL AS IT DOES AGAINST OPIATES. THIS IS PRIMARILY A PRODUCT OF INTERNATIONAL PRIDE AS THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CANNIBIS PRODUCTS ARE GOING TO EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA WHILE OPIATES ARE REMAINING IN THIS REGION.

(4) THE PNCB HAS DEMAND REDUCTION IN ITS CHARTER BUT HAS NOT HAD TIME OR RESOURCES TO MOVE IN THIS AREA.

DURING ITS FIRST THREE YEARS IN OPERATION, THE PNCB CONCENTRATED ITS MANPOWER AND RESOURCES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT, POPPY LICENSING, THE UN INCOME

SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM, AND LIMITED DATA GATHERING. A DIRECTOR FOR TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION WAS NAMED ONLY IN EARLY 1977. THERE ARE NO OTHER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 5741

AGENCIES ACTIVE IN THIS AREA WITH THE MINOR EXCEPTION
OF THE EXCISE AND TAXATION DEPARTMENT OF THE SIND
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT. THAT DEPARTMENT IS RUNNING
A SMALL EXPERIMENT IN ONE DISTRICT BY CLOSING LICENSED
VENDS AND DISTRIBUTING TO ADDICTS THROUGH GOVERNMENT
DISPENSARIES.

(5) NONE KNOWN TO EMBASSY.

(6) NONE KNOWN TO EMBASSY.

D. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES AND PROGRAMS:

(1) A VERY FEW GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE
PRIME MINISTER, SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR,
MOST OF THE PNCB AND A SCATTERED FEW IN OTHER LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PERCEIVE NARCOTICS AS BOTH A
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM OF GROWING SERIOUS-
NESS. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO ELIMINATION
OF NARCOTICS, BUT THEIR COMMITMENT IS MITIGATED BY
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. OTHERS SEE ONLY
A PROBLEM IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND MANY RESENT THE FACT
THAT PAKISTAN IS BEING ASKED TO COMMIT SCARCE
RESOURCES TO BENEFIT OTHER, PRIMARILY RICH, DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES.

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(2) THERE IS A REASONABLY STRONG COMMITMENT TO NARCOTICS CONTROL THROUGH THE CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE PNCB ALL THE WAY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT EVEN THE PRIME MINISTER MUST OPERATE WITHIN POLITICAL AND RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS. THIS COMMITMENT IS IMPLEMENTED IN A VERY SLOW MANNER WITH OCCASIONAL ABRUPT STEPS BACKWARD. AS THE COMMITMENT IS NIL IN OTHER AGENCIES, SUPPORT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT HAD THE POLITICAL STRENGTH, WILL NOR RESOURCES TO FORCE A WIDER COMMITMENT.

(3) THE ONLY RECENT CHANGES WHICH HAVE OCCURRED WERE TO BRING HASHISH UNDER THE GENERAL NARCOTICS LAWS AND

TO EXTEND, ON PAPER, THE NARCOTICS LAWS TO RECENTLY MERGED AREAS. THE GOP HAS BEEN PROMISING FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS A COMPREHENSIVE NARCOTICS LAW. THIS LAW HAS BEEN DELAYED IN SECURING CLEARANCE FROM SEVERAL FEDERAL MINISTRIES AND ALL THE PROVINCES, AND BY LOW POLITICAL COMMITMENT. AT EACH DRAFT STAGE THE LEGISLATION WAS SENT TO GENEVA OR A UN EXPERT WAS REQUESTED TO VISIT PAKISTAN. THE LAW HAS NOW PASSED ALL STAGES READY FOR ACTION BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUT THE CURRENT POLITICAL CRISES IN PAKISTAN MAKES ANY GUESS AS TO TIME OF FINAL PASSAGE HAZARDOUS. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE NEW LEGISLATION ARE THAT IT GRANTS BROAD REGULATION WRITING AUTHORITY TO THE PNCB, ESTABLISHED MINIMUM SENTENCES AND ESTABLISHES CONSPIRACY AS A NARCOTICS CRIME.

(4) THERE ARE NO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS KNOWN TO ACTIVELY OPPOSE NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROGRAM, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY OFFICIAL COULD TAKE SUCH A POSITION. AS DESCRIBED EARLIER, HOWEVER, THERE ARE OFFICIALS
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THROUGHOUT THE NWFP GOVERNMENT WHO DISPLAY A DISTINCT LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE PROGRAM AND VAST NUMBERS OF OFFICIALS IN OTHER PAKISTAN GOVERNMENTS WHO ARE COMPLETELY UNINTERESTED IN NARCOTICS PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS.

E. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT:

(1) THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PAKISTAN COULD BECOME A VERY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AS A

SUPPLIER OF OPIATES WITHIN THE NEXT 3-5 YEARS. THE DEPARTMENT HAS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT WITH THE PROBABLE SUCCESS IN THE MEXICAN ERADICATION PROGRAM, FIRST THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE AND THEN THE PAK-AFGHAN AREAS HOLD THE GREATEST THREAT FOR WORLD ILLICIT SUPPLY. IF CONTROL PROGRAMS IN BOTH THESE AREAS BEGIN TO SHOW RESULTS WE BELIEVE THE PAK-AFGHAN AREA COULD THEN BECOME THE GREATEST THREAT. BOTH THE TRIANGLE AND PAK-AFGHAN AREAS HAVE GROWING REGIONS WHICH ARE PRESENTLY BEYOND CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, TRAFFICKING ROUTES OUT OF THE TRIANGLE ARE LIMITED PROVIDING SOME POTENTIAL FOR CONTROL. ROUTES OUT OF THE PAK-AFGHAN TRIBAL AREAS ARE ALMOST LIMITLESS.

(2) PAKISTAN IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THE REGIONAL PATTERN AS A SUPPLIER OF BOTH OPIATES AND CANNIBIS. PAKISTAN IS OF ONLY LIMITED IMPORTANCE AS A TRANSIT RCOUNTRY FOR FOREIGN DRUGS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT A FEW PAKISTANIS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED INTRAFFICKING IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN OPIATES FROM HONG KONG TO EUROPE AND THAT THIS TRAFFIC MAY TRANSIT PAKISTAN'S AIRPORTS.

(3) THE UNITED STATES IS SECOND ONLY TO THE UN IN ITS INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN ON NARCOTICS CONTROL. ON THE OPERATIONAL ENFORCEMENT LEVEL OUR INFLUENCE IS PARAMOUNT DUE TO THE EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOPED AND CONFIDENTIAL

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MAINTAINED BY OUR DEA WITH THE PNCB. HOWEVER, THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW INITIATIVES ARE PRESENTLY LIMITED BY THE POLITICAL STRAINS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, THE NECESSITY TO BRING A NUMBER OF ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND BOTH CENTRAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS INTO MOST PROJECTS, AND THE LACK OF POSITIVE MOTIVATION IN THE KEY NWFP GOVERNMENT. THE

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EMBASSY HAS JUST COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE JOINT REVIEW WITH THE PNCB OF THAT AGENCY'S OPERATIONS. IF THE RECOMMENDATIONS COMING FROM THIS REVIEW ARE ADOPTED, THE PNCB COULD BECOME A MORE EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND CENTRAL COORDINATOR OF THE ENTIRE NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM. OUR INCOUNTRY DEA AGENTS HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN INSTRUCTORS' TRAINING PROGRAM WHICH MAY LEAD TO BASIC NARCOTICS TRAINING BEING OFFERED BY PAKISTANIS WITHIN SEVERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MILITARY AGENCIES. WE HAVE OFFERED TO DISCUSS A COMPREHENSIVE PILOT INCOME SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM IN THE SWABI AREA AND ARE FINANCING A SURVEY TO GATHER SOCIO/ECONOMIC DATA TO DETERMINE IF, AND WHAT TYPE, PROGRAM WE MIGHT DEVELOP. WE ARE IN THE VERY EARLY STAGES OF STUDYING TRANSPORTATION AND MARKETING OF POTENTIAL ALTERNATE CROPS TO DETERMINE IF THERE MIGHT BE ONE OR MORE SMALLER PROJECTS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE MARKET VALUE OF ALTERNATE CROPS.

(4) THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT PAKISTAN HAS VERY LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE NARCOTICS PROGRAM. THE NATURAL REGIONAL LEADER WOULD BE IRAN WHICH IS THE PRIMARY CONSUMER OF ILLICIT OPIATES FROM BOTH PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN AND IS CONFIDENTIAL

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INFLUENTIAL WITH BOTH COUNTRIES AS A MAJOR AID DONOR.

PAST POLITICAL STRAINS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN'S LACK OF INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF NARCOTICS HAVE BEEN OBSTACLES TO REGIONAL COOPERATION. AS BOTH OF THESE OBSTACLES APPEAR TO BE ABATING THERE IS INCREASING POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PNCB HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN SOME NARCOTICS TRAINING FACILITY. THIS MIGHT BE A LOGICAL STARTING POINT FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. CONSTABLE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLICIES, PROGRAMS (PROJECTS)
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 03-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977ISLAMA05741
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770198-0952
Format: TEL
From: ISLAMABAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770694/aaaadehr.tel
Line Count: 653
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7466c785-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 12
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 STATE 101326
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 07-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2292031
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DRUG CONTROL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
TAGS: SNAR, PK
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7466c785-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
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